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March 15, 2010
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Leading Indicators: Off-the-Radar News Roundup

Posted By Judah Grunstein 15 Mar 2010 - Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao might have used muscular language to discuss U.S.-China relations in his annual press conference, but he took time to reassure Taiwanese manufacturers and farmers on the potential impact of the proposed China-Taiwan economic cooperation framework agreement.

- For the fourth time in two weeks, Indian and Bangladeshi border forces exchanged fire near a disputed area of the frontier. Everyone seems to be pretty used to this sort of thing on a number of India's borders, although the villagers still moved to safer ground.

- Nepal's army chief told a visiting U.N. official that he would not integrate former Maoist guerillas into the Nepalese army en masse. The stance is in contravention of the 2006 peace accord that put an end to Nepal's insurgency, and already destabilized the country last year when the previous chief of staff adopted the same position.

- Russia's energy minister threw cold water on the idea of merging the South Stream gas pipeline project with the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project.

- The U.S. isn't the only Western country to earn Turkey's wrath for the passage of an Armenian genocide resolution. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan cancelled a scheduled visit to Stockholm after the Swedish Parliament passed a similar resolution. Erdogan was to sign a "strategic partnership" while in Stockholm, by which the two countries were to hold high-level political, economic and cultural consultations.

- The EU's commissioner for competition called the creation of a European Monetary Fund a good idea for the long term, but said it would not be a practical short-term solution given the urgency of the current Greek debt crisis.

- The general heading Guinea's military junta (the power behind the transitional government's throne) has ruled out running for president in upcoming elections scheduled for June. He also warned Guinea's military not to interfere in the transfer of power to an elected civilian government.

- South Africa's deputy ambassador to Zimbabwe announced that President Jacob Zuma will visit the country tomorrow, in an effort to jumpstart negotiations on salvaging the perpetually stalled power-sharing arrangement between Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe's  ZANU-PF party and the opposition MDC party headed by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. I mentioned Zuma had stuck his neck out with the EU and IMF on Mugabe's behalf despite having little to show for his recent mediation efforts. This visit suggests the bill has now come do.

- Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva arrived in the Middle East yesterday, for a visit that brings him to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. Lula's visit is ostensibly meant to advance his hopes of serving as a mediator in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It's a nice thought, and one certain to please Brazilophiles, but the operative factoid here is that this marks the first visit to the region by a Brazilian head of state since 1876.

- The governing party of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and his congressional allies won majorities in both houses in the country's congressional elections on Sunday.

Researched by Kari Lipschutz.

The U.S. and Israel: From Allies to Neighbors

Posted By Judah Grunstein 15 Mar 2010 If you haven't seen it yet, click through and take a look at Mark Perry's Foreign Policy article on some recent shifts in the U.S. military's strategic framing of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Although the story ran in the aftermath of Vice President Joe Biden's disastrous trip to Israel, the events it reports took place beforehand, and give some background for where Biden's alleged "This is getting serious for us" quote came from.

Laura Rozen smartly places the "meta" narrative in the context of a pre-emptive White House defense against any Israeli efforts by way of congressional supporters to limit the fallout. She then asks what the "meta meta" might be. I'll venture this as an answer. Whether or not every bit of what Perry writes is true (and according to an FP update, the military has already denied some of it), it seems like the broader narrative was inevitable the minute the U.S. committed not just to underwriting regional security in the Middle East, but to a long-term skin-in-the-game military-diplomatic presence. Yes, this has to do with the 110,000-odd troops still in Iraq, and probably as much with the roughly 4,400 that have already died there. But remember, too, that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq would be the biggest such structure in the world, were it not for the projected size of the one in Afghanistan.

The timing of the East Jerusalem construction announcement during Biden's visit is actually not that extraordinary in the historical context of U.S.-Israel relations, that is, between the two countries as allies. Israeli obstructionists have long used such visits to toss a wrench or two into the gears of whatever latest peace initiative the visiting U.S. emissary was peddling. But what it seems like the Israeli obstructionist camp has been slow to realize is that we're no longer just allies. We're now neighbors, too. So it's no longer just a question of American interests at stake. It's a question of American lives.

Now, there are all sorts of structural reasons that mitigate against radical shifts in the U.S.-Israel relationship, and as Walter Russell Mead has been making clear on his blog recently, the role of the Likud-AIPAC axis is not as monolithic as many critics of the U.S. policy toward Israel -- and Israeli policy in general -- might claim.

But it still strikes me as very shortsighted on the part of Israeli strategic planners to not realize the significance of the fact that, for the time being, the U.S. has moved in next door.

Update: As an afterthought, I think a lot of this could have been avoided had the Obama administration made opening up Gaza to humanitarian aid the initial goodwill gesture it demanded of the Netanyahu government, instead of the public commitment to a settlement freeze. Humanitarian aid in Gaza would have had a significant, immediate impact on the lives of Palestinians, while not necessarily creating a coalition-breaking condition for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. By contrast, the settlement freeze approach involves in immediately suicidal step from Netanyahu on projects that are in fact slow-moving, and that can be held up in litigation and bureaucracy as need be. In addition, the Obama could have brought real pressure to bear, in the form of a (private) threat of unilateral U.S. humanitarian action in Gaza, something that's not possible with announcing a freeze on settlement construction.

France's Regional Elections: Sarkozy Down?

Posted By Judah Grunstein 15 Mar 2010 You'll probably see a lot of headlines today about how French President Nicolas Sarkozy took a beating in the first round of France's regional elections yesterday. Take it with a grain of salt. Abstention hit a record in the low 50 percent range (i.e., most voters stayed home), the election was an off-year regional affair with no national impact, and it's hard to imagine any incumbent doing that well in the current economic climate. It's also unclear whether the Socialists and the Green coalition that came in third nationally will be able to work together to cut the necessarily deals for the second-round voting next weekend. Nevertheless, it's possible to draw some conclusions:

- Despite Sarkozy's success at peeling away Front National voters in 2007, Sunday's results demonstrate that, among the die-hard voters that went to the polls, there is a residual pool of FN constituents that is not going away. I'd put it at roughly 10 percent nationally, which means that depending on other factors -- such as a weak economy and a poorly timed Sarkozy effort to inject xenophobia into the campaign -- France will continue to have an "FN problem" for the foreseeable future.

- Two factors suggest that the Socialist Party's victory will sow the seeds of their future defeat. First, in strengthening the respective leadership claims of both party Chairwoman Martine Aubry (who comes out on top in the first domestic election she managed) and ex-presidential candidate Ségolène Royal (who led a stronger-than-national-average showing in her region), it did nothing to put to rest an eventual leadership struggle between the two, who nearly succeeded at splitting the party the last time that happened. And second, the strong showing of the governing-free Europe Ecology coalition suggests that the left has seduced on the basis of its identity, not its policies.

- Sarkozy is cooked. What? Didn't I just say to take the headlines with a grain of salt? Yes, but it's not the voters I'm talking about -- although they, too, are tired of the agitated stage persona with little results to show for it. I'm thinking more of the internal politics of his center-right coalition. Minus the reasonable wing of the FN that he managed to peel away in 2007, Sarkozy has to appeal to too broad a range of voters, yes, but more importantly too broad a range of party leaders, when his leadership style is divide and conquer. From the Chiraco-Gaullist flank (Villepin) to the UMP "faithful" (Fillon and Cope) to the New Center (Morin), there are too many sharks and too much blood in the water now for him to pull it off. Given the uncertainty that unity will carry the day, there's little incentive for any of them to put their ambition in the passenger seat.

My hunch (for more than a year now) is that Sarkozy doesn't run again in 2012. He has a flair for drama. After all, he trusted the writing of his campaign "biography" to a playwright, Yasmina Reza. And what would be more dramatic than walking off stage while the spotlight circles around trying to find him?

For far more educated analysis, take a look at what Art Goldhammer has to say (that's a sound general rule, by the way, too), as well as Charles Bremner.

Greek Debt Crisis: And the Loser is . . .

Posted By Judah Grunstein 15 Mar 2010 Germany. Whether it's the gathering meme blaming German trade imbalances and "hidden" protectionism (labor cost competition) for the current crisis, or the increasing likelihood that the monetary/debt crisis will drive further EU budgetary coordination and economic government, the Germans are looking more and more like they'll turn out to be the big losers from the Greek debt crisis. After the Greeks, that is -- and even there, I'm not so sure.

Containing a Nuclear Iran

Posted By Judah Grunstein 15 Mar 2010 It's reassuring to see my biggest concern about a nuclear Iran -- the dangers of a regional nuclear arms race -- articulated by Brent Scowcroft at the very end of this NY Times article on the potential shift in CW on the issue. The Times piece pivots off a much longer Foreign Affairs article by Ray Tayekh and James Lindsay, which I haven't had a chance to read in its entirety. Their three containment red lines, which the Times summarizes, seem well thought out:

They urge Mr. Obama to prescribe three explicit no-go zones for the Iranians: "no initiation of conventional warfare" against another nation; "no transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, or technologies"; no increase in support for terrorists. The penalty, they argued, would have to include "military retaliation by any and all means necessary," including the use of nuclear weapons.

The other problem with containment (which Tayekh and Lindsay may address in their article) is that it comes at a pretty bad time for such an ambitious effort. All the indicators these days point to the wisdom of a U.S. foreign policy of restraint, whereas this is the kind of project that demands a lengthy commitment of resources and political will. And if the first response from Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is to go nuclear themselves, it could fatally undermine the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee needed for such an effort.

Having said all that, and in acknowledging that there are no good outcomes here short of a spontaneous shift in political will on the part of Tehran, I also think that the doomsday scenarios on both sides are a bit exagerrated. Tehran has some conventional and asymmetric deterrents to make an American or Israeli attack unattractive, but they are far from absolute (hence the desire for a nuclear capability). What's more, it's not an ironclad certainty the Iranians will unleash them, or that they will turn out to be so very crippling in the event the Iranians do.

By the same token, I'm not convinced that nuclear deterrence (i.e., containment) is the wisest formula for a region with such low trust and short flight times, not to mention the potential for multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) equations. But the much-feared regional rush to the bomb is also not an ironclad certainty, and the very existence of a multilateral nuclear deterrent could drive the creation of stabilizing institutional mechanisms for oversight and mediation.

Which is to say, there's no policy option that someone who has a realistic take on things can be very enthusiastic about. But my hunch is that after the strategic surprise wears off, we'll find some way to muddle through whatever it is that ends up happening.

Leading Indicators: Off-the-Radar News Roundup

Posted By Judah Grunstein 12 Mar 2010 - ASEAN's secretary-general will visit China next week at the invitation of the Chinese foreign minister. The visit comes in the context of increasing concerns in Southeast Asia over effects of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on Jan. 1.

- Ukraine's parliament formed a government coalition in support of recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych, and approved his former campaign manager as the country's new prime minister. The move puts an end to the period of hostile co-habitation between the country's head of state and head of government that existed under the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko Orange coalition. Yanukovych's coalition includes the Communist Party and a former Orange coalition member, marking the official close of the post-Cold War period.

- In separate deals signed with Sri Lanka last week, China and India committed more than $400 million to developing the island nation's rail infrastructure, with China also signing on to build an airport. The conventional wisdom is that Sri Lanka has become the latest arena for the Asian powers' rivalry, with both trying to take advantage of the end of the civil war to extend their influence.

- The ill will in Europe over the U.S. Air Force tanker tender debacle is far from dissipating, with a spokesman for the French Defense Ministry saying, in reference to the Northrop-EADS tanker that initially won the bid, "[I]t is difficult to understand how an aircraft that was declared in 2008 to respond perfectly to American needs no longer meets these needs after a modification of the tender." He added, "European countries can legitimately ask for an explanation." Would the senator from Boeing care to respond?

- The EU Observer has obtained more details of the draft organizational plan for the European diplomatic corps that Catherine Ashton is planning to submit to EU officials, as well as some of the frontrunners for the various posts.

- Pakistan's navy successfully test-fired a series of missiles and torpedoes today in the Arabian Sea, saying they would "send a message of deterrence to anyone harboring nefarious designs" against the country. I found the Bush administration's Manichean references to good vs. evil a bit heavyhanded, but I think U.S. foreign policy discourse would benefit from greater use of terms like "nefarious" and "dastardly."

- You might not have noticed, but Turkey and the IMF agreed to suspend prolonged talks on reaching a stand-by agreement. If so, you're not alone. Markets, too, have so far ignored what some observers are calling a "historic transformation in Turkey-IMF relations," suggesting that the IMF deal is not as essential to the Turkish economy as some have argued.

Researched by Kari Lipschutz.

U.S. Power in an Age of Transitions

Posted By Judah Grunstein 12 Mar 2010 I just got through reading a few unrelated blog posts that combine to make for an interesting discussion of the U.S. response to shifting regional dynamics in Asia and the Middle East. Hugh White sketches how he thinks the U.S. should adapt its Asia strategy to accomodate China's rise, while Tobias Harris exposes the limitations of the "losing Japan" narrative. Meanwhile, Elias Muhanna argues that the U.S. narrative of a moderate vs. militant divide in the Middle East fails to take into account how the landscape has shifted there, quoting this from a Washington Post op-ed by Rob Malley and Peter Harling to describe how the two poles look today:

One, backed by Iran, emphasizes resistance to Israel and the West, speaks to the region's thirst for dignity and prioritizes military cooperation. The other, symbolized by Turkey, highlights diplomacy, stresses engagement with all parties and values economic integration.

The choice of Turkey here is noteworthy, since it's the poster child for countries that, in the face of the radically increased possibilities for trade and relations offered by the globalized world, insist on not being forced to limit themselves by the outmoded dynamic of picking sides. That's also the theme of White's post -- and Harris' -- regarding both our allies and friends in Asia. For now, China is very carefully playing its hand to avoid putting them in the position of doing so, which makes developing a forward-looking American policy for Asia all the more complicated. Containing China's regional influence would be counterproductive, even if it were possible. But neither is it a question of abandoning our allies and friends who depend on our presence to keep Beijing honest.

Compare that with Iran, whose more upfront hostility and belligerence makes it easier to rally the region's friendly governments, but not their publics, who make for sympathetic audiences for Tehran's message, especially since al-Qaida has been discredited as the "local underdog" sticking up for Muslims in the face of Western opporession. The result is that a policy of containing Iran is more politically feasible, but will be effective only if it's accompanied by a real shift in what U.S. policy delivers on the ground. A two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and some real commitments to popular reforms in the Arab world would be a good place to start, but I'm not holding my breath waiting for either.

Finally, as luck would have it, Defense Industry Daily's morning roundup happened to point me in the direction of this Andrew Krepinovich paper (.pdf) on the challenges that China and Iran's growing anti-access/area denial capacities pose to U.S. military planners. The tie-in, of course, is that the U.S. ability to underwrite stability in Asia and the Middle East depends on the latent deterrent of U.S. military power. That will prove even more crucial in the decade to come, to insure that the regional shifts currently taking place progress and evolve in ways that reinforce a stable, integrated and peaceful order.

In other words, the Turkey model, and not the Iranian model -- but also, as White argues, not the American primacy model. Krepinovich's paper is the first of two, with the second to treat the U.S. AirSea Battle strategy meant to respond to access denial efforts. The broader strategic challenge, though, is to make sure U.S. military power remains an effective deterrent, without destabilizing what is at present a fragile and jittery transition period. That is, without making a hamhanded grab for dominance.

There are certainly risks to an approach of measured restraint in the face of emerging powers, and as Japan demonstrated in the late-1980s, predictions of inevitable rise should be taken with a grain of salt. But even if China levels off, the advantages to the U.S. of a more evenly distributed security burden are clear, even if it comes at the cost of sharing the benefits of influence as well.

Leading Indicators: Off-the-Radar News Roundup

Posted By Judah Grunstein 11 Mar 2010 - Indian officials said that India and Russia will sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as well as the final draft of the many-times-revised Admiral Gorhkov refitting contract during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. A visa pact facilitating business travel also figures prominently in the stack of deals to be inked.

- Meanwhile, India's defense minister confirmed before the Indian parliament that India had formally requested to purchase 10 U.S.-made C-17 transport planes, for a price of $1.7 billion. This comes on top of last year's $2.1 billion deal to purchase eight U.S.-made maritime patrol aircraft. This is more evidence of an Indian shift toward a balanced procurement basket, even if it remains heavily weighted toward Russian-made big-ticket items.

- Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in Islamabad yesterday for a two-day visit that included a meeting with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, as well as meetings involving high-level defense, interior and foreign affairs officials from both countries.

- IMF President Dominique Strauss-Kahn said that South African President Jacob Zuma lobbied him to resume the fund's lending to Zimbabwe in a meeting on Tuesday, but that due to the political situation in the country, such a move was not yet possible. The news here is that Zuma has now pressured both the EU and the IMF to end their aid and development embargoes, despite having received no significant political returns on his recent re-investment in brokering a deal to save Zimbabawe's "frozen solution" power-sharing government. In other words, he's carrying water for Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, even though Mugabe stiffed him, which suggests that Zuma's got serious problems back home.

- Germany's foreign minister is on a tour of South America, in an effort to make up lost ground in a region long neglected by Berlin. Stops include Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile.

- The head of Gazprom's Italian partner company in the South Stream pipeline project proposed combining that project with the EU's troubled Nabucco pipeline, long cast as a rival to South Stream. Look to see this suggestion pop up more and more in the coming months. When you hear it coming from either Moscow or Brussels, pay attention.

- Chinese telecom giant China Mobile announced it would pay $5.8 billion for a 20 percent stake of a Shanghai development bank as part of its plans to enter the mobile banking market. If you think wireless and telecom are huge now, wait until they begin driving massive flows of liquidity across the developing world. The possibilities are mind-boggling. Consider that one of the factors driving desertion and payday AWOLs in the Afghan security forces is the lack of a national banking system, forcing grunts to hand-deliver their paychecks back home.

- Brazilian President Luiz Inacia Lula da Silva asked U.S. President Barack Obama to send a negotiating team to resolve a dispute over U.S. cotton subsidies that the WTO has already decided in Brazil's favor. Brazil yesterday published a list of 102 U.S. products that will face higher tariffs in the event a deal is not reached. Adding insult to injury, Lula remarked, "If the United States had, along with Brazil, made a deal in the Doha Development Round, we would not be fighting now, and the African people would be selling their cotton in the U.S. and Europe."

Researched by Kari Lipschutz.

Major Sporting Events Impact Housing Rights

Posted By Juliette Terzieff 11 Mar 2010 Governments and international sports bodies routinely fail to protect area residents from forced evictions ahead of large sporting events, independent United Nations investigator Raquel Rolnik told journalists this week.

While the International Olympic Committee has initiated a plan to respond to housing concerns, the soccer governing body FIFA has failed to respond to repeated requests to make guaranteed respect for housing rights a part of the bidding process, the Associated Press reported.

As of 2016, any country vying to host an Olympic Games will have to make a clear commitment on housing issues. But in a report to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Rolnik reported claims that over 20,000 people are being moved out of their homes ahead of the soccer World Cup in South Africa this June and July.

International sporting events like the World Cup or the Olympics have a history of attracting the attention of human rights advocates -- both for violations attached to preparations for the event, and for the general rights situation in host countries.

A prime recent example is the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when human rights advocates from around the world used the resulting global spotlight to raise concerns on a wide array of issues. Activist groups targeted China over domestic concerns ranging from media freedom and freedom of association, to housing and privacy rights. Activists also encouraged Western governments and multinational corporations to put pressure on Chinese authorities to use their leverage as Sudan's largest arms supplier to help end conflict in the Darfur region.

After the games ended, however, many human rights groups claimed the rights situation had deteriorated as a direct result of Beijing having hosted the event.

Human Rights Watch has called on the IOC to create permanent mechanisms to monitor the rights situations in host countries before and after future Olympic Games.

The upcoming 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia, are also likely to draw significant attention from rights advocates. Sochi is located in the eastern Black Sea region -- an impoverished area home to widespread corruption and frequent violence associated with organized crime, and close to conflict zones in Ingushetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya.

Russia is also a regular target for attacks over its human rights record. Rights activists are already tying their concerns over a spate of abductions and murders of human rights lawyers, activists and journalists to the Olympics. Earlier this month Reporters Without Borders reiterated its concerns over the lack of media freedom in the Sochi region.

EU Foreign Policy: Ashton Strikes Back

Posted By Judah Grunstein 11 Mar 2010 If you've been following the saga of the EU's foreign policy wars, you know that: 1) EU "foreign minister" Catherine Ashton has taken some heavy fire for what critics consider an underwhelming start to leading the union's common foreign policy in the post-Lisbon era; and, 2) there's been a barroom brawl going on behind the scenes for influence in the powers and staffing of the future European diplomatic corps, known as the EAS.

So with regard to the first point, it's interesting to read this EU Observer account of Ashton's visibly more-assured appearance before the European Parliament to give her vision of EU foreign policy. Particularly noteworthy was her openness to examining the question of a permanent headquarters for EU defense operations. This apparent shift in her stance comes in the aftermath of a meeting with French Defense Minister Hervé Morin to discuss the subject, and in the context of a long-running historical standoff on the issue between the French (stubbornly for) and the British (adamantly against) that at times resembles a religious war. Ashton's willingness to play evenhandedly here suggests that she might adopt a more independent position vis à vis the British foreign office than critics have suggested. Meanwhile, her pointed protest to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton regarding U.S. sanctions on European companies doing business with Iran suggests that she is far from the pushover that critics have portrayed.

As for the knives coming out in Brussels, the turf war has to date pitted the supranational European Commission against the intergovernmental European Council, with the European Parliament siding with the former due to its greater oversight role over it. But now it appears that there are the makings of an internal struggle within the Euoprean Council, with the so-called Visegrad states -- Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic -- demanding more posts for their national diplomats in the EAS as well. Collectively, they have the same voting weight as France and Germany combined, and a host of other "second-tier" EU member states are rallying to their position.

For American observers who have difficulty making sense of all of this, imagine the U.S. where: 1) the federal prerogative (EU Commission) over state law was severely curtailed, limited mainly to issues affecting interstate commerce and external trade policy; 2) the president (European Commission head) took his marching orders from a council of state governors (European Council, now permanently presided by the so-called "EU president"), with particular policy areas overseen by councils of state secretaries; and, 3) Congress (European Parliament) had oversight over the president, but less so over the council of governors.

Now throw in the fact that: 1) the European Commission already has delegations throughout the world to conduct the policy initiatives for which it has prerogative (trade and aid); 2) the national governments, of course, maintain their embassies; and, 3) the EAS is institutionally mandated to assume some, but not all, of the responsibilities of both, and it's not terribly clear which ones they are. Now you've got an idea of the kind of institutional bind in which Ashton and the EU find themselves.

All of this will be resolved, although perhaps not as quickly (April) as had been hoped. What's at stake is which precedents are set. Even those can shift over time, but they will determine the default setting for the institutional balance of power in the EAS. And if one thing is certain, in the EU, changing the default setting is not an easy task.