The U.S. government has recognized Edmundo Gonzalez as Venezuela’s president-elect, months after the country’s presidential election in July. President Nicolas Maduro claimed to have won the vote, despite the opposition collecting and posting tally sheets that showed Gonzalez defeating him in a landslide. (AP)
At first glance, the Biden administration’s recognition of Gonzalez as president-elect may seem like a logical, graduated step in its response to Venezuela’s stolen election. After all, the U.S. had already acknowledged that Gonzalez had earned more votes than Maduro, and in September, Washington imposed sanctions on Maduro allies it said were involved in election fraud.
The U.S. also has some reputational stake in Venezuela’s political crisis, since it had relaxed sanctions on Caracas to facilitate a pre-election deal between the Maduro regime and the Venezuelan opposition that was meant to ensure a free and fair vote. Even if there were no better alternatives available, many critics warned at the time that the deal was bound to fail. Now that it has, the Biden team probably doesn’t want to be seen as doing nothing to respond.
On closer inspection, though, responding with this particular move is more perplexing, in large part because the U.S. already tried a similar maneuver in 2019, when it and dozens of other countries recognized then-opposition leader Juan Guaido as the de jure president of Venezuela. That strategy failed, as James Bosworth noted last year, mostly because it didn’t change the balance of power on the ground in Caracas, even as it complicated diplomatic efforts to resolve Venezuela’s multiple crises. Moreover, the Maduro regime suffered more from U.S. sanctions than from Venezuela’s international isolation, but it ultimately enjoyed enough support from Russia, China and, to a lesser extent, Iran to weather that storm. No part of that equation has changed in the five years since then.
The timing of this move is also curious, since it comes in Biden’s lame-duck period ahead of former President Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House. In effect, Biden is now handing the Venezuela file back to Trump exactly as Trump handed it to him: with a hefty amount of sanctions on Venezuela and U.S. recognition of a de jure president who has no real power in Caracas.
One possible explanation is that the move could be an attempt by the Biden administration to make it harder for Trump to walk back pressure on Caracas. Of course, doing so would be a complete reversal for Trump, who during his first term enacted a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Venezuela and has repeatedly expressed his hostility to the Maduro regime.
But a reversal from hostility to diplomacy would not be out of character for Trump. After all, that’s what he did during his first term with North Korea, which unlike Venezuela poses a real security threat to the U.S. and its allies. And in the case of Venezuela, it would also be in line with his transactional approach to foreign policy. While Caracas had little to offer Trump during his first term, it will now be a necessary partner for Trump to implement his promised mass deportation scheme, considering the massive increase in Venezuelan refugees now trying to enter the United States.
