Special Report: U.S. Military Doctrine After the Long War

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan drove an evolution in U.S. military doctrine that saw the emergence and rapid rise to prominence of counterinsurgency and stability operations. With the U.S. preparing to leave Iraq and draw down its mission in Afghanistan, this WPR report examines U.S. military doctrine in — and after — the Long War.

Below are links to each article in this special report, which subscribers can read in full. Not a subscriber? Purchase this document for Kindle or as a PDF from Scribd. Or subscribe now.

Institutionalizing Adaptation: U.S. Counterinsurgency Capabilities Must Improve
By John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton
August 5, 2008

Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: An Interview with John Nagl
By Urs Gehriger
September 18, 2008

Malaya and Algeria: Lessons in Counterinsurgency
By Stephen D. Sklenka
March 2, 2007

Iraqi Forces Will Boast Counterinsurgency Capabilities the U.S. Lacks
By David Axe
September 19, 2007

‘Senator’s Son’ a Good Window into COIN
By Thomas P.M. Barnett
March 8, 2010

Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities
By Gian P. Gentile
March 4, 2008

The Limits of the Surge: An Interview with Gian Gentile
By Judah Grunstein
April 11, 2008