WPR BlogAfrica

Did Mission Creep Kill the AFRICOM Base?

What stood out most about George Bush’s farewell tour of Africa — besides the development funds he handed out like “Santa Claus” — was his admission that American plans for another military base in that continent are dead. The question remains: Was an AFRICOM headquarters in Africa doomed by the increasing opposition to the plan among Africans and their governments, or was it done in by mission creep?

AFRICOM began in February 2007 as simply a separate command to oversee all U.S. military operations in Africa (except Egypt). But it also stood for more than streamlining responsibilities. Enmeshed in its DNA from day one was what the Pentagon refers to as “capacity building”: By helping Africans build democratic institutions and establish good governance U.S. forces could help root out pockets of poverty and disorder that remain fertile grounds for terrorist groups. Also, U.S. soldiers engaged in “soft power” missions could reduce the appeal of extremism and curb peoples’ mistrust of American intentions

The evolution of this approach began taking shape after Sept. 11, 2001 when the military inaugurated Camp Lemonier in Djibuti to monitor terror groups in eastern Africa (ie. those who had previously attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). Importantly, the nearly 1,500 troops were also tasked with providing military-to-military training in different countries and offering the local population development assistance, like building schools and hospitals, digging wells and providing medical and veterinary assistance.

The U.S. military began casting its eyes towards mineral-rich West Africa in 2002 when it launched the Pan Sahel Initiative to help protect borders, track the movement of people and enhance regional security in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. The U.S. military was quick to point out that terror groups (and smugglers) move seamlessly across these mostly unguarded borders, but the garrisons straddling either side of them had no methods to communicate.

The Pan Sahel Initiative was eventually folded into the much more expansive Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. Unlike the previous program’s “Band-Aid approach” of fighting terrorism, TSCTI’s five-year, $100 million budget not only increased the number of countries involved — adding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria — but also added the hearts-and-minds approach.

From the get-go, it seemed the Pentagon became serious about leveraging its soft power in West Africa. Shooting exercises with the Malian military, for example, were combined with trips to villages to provide treatment for malnutrition, malaria, stomach worms and a handful of other maladies.

But while the footprint for the U.S. military remained relatively small for the TSCTI — “we like to fly under the radar,” a soldier told me — the Pentagon couldn’t shake skepticism over America’s real interests. Africa Confidential’s editor Patrick Smith questioned whether the U.S. was making the mistake of viewing Africa through the lens of the War on Terror. A 2005 International Crisis Group report showed that even with the region’s high poverty rates, mounting governance issues and the few terror groups operating within its borders, “the Sahel is clearly not a hotbed of terrorist activity…” Others pointed out that the U.S. warmed up to Africa only after the Chinese government began throwing its money around the continent. And the fact that the U.S. will soon purchase 25 percent of its oil from African states didn’t go unnoticed.

In pushing for a U.S. presence on the continent, the Pentagon argued that an AFRICOM “staff headquarters” (the term “base” was rarely used) would allow the military to better serve and train local soldiers, better provide development work and more quickly respond to crisis and contingencies. That’s when the project began running into roadblocks. Most African countries didn’t mind the extra equipment and training for its militaries, and the locals certainly didn’t mind the occasional doctors and veterinarian visits. But providing the U.S. government with real estate for a permanent base was beyond reproach.

South Africa refused first, and its neighbors soon followed suit. The continent’s other major power, Nigeria, also vocally declined. Only Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf welcomed the Americans. (Liberia was once home to a Cold War-era U.S. communications station.) In Accra Wednesday, Bush reiterated that he would seriously consider her invitation.

African intransigence might just have saved Bush and the Pentagon from more headaches, such as defining AFRICOM’s role, alternately defined as preventing African crises from spiraling out of control, providing “stability” to the continent, offering humanitarian and development assistance, and creating economic and political growth.

With the backdrop of Kenya’s post-election chaos in mind, the Washington Post’s David Ignatius addressed what seemed to be the command’s first real-world scenario: If AFRICOM were up and running, what would it do in Kenya? The question remains unanswered. Despite disavowing France’s historically corrupt and paternalistic post-colonial African policy, Nicolas Sarkozy still used French forces to rescue Chad’s dictator, Idriss Deby, when he was threatened recently by rebels. Does the U.S. military really want to play such a role on this continent of soaring economies, but still fragile political systems?

WPR BlogAfrica

Did Mission Creep Kill The AFRICOM Base?

What stood out most about George Bush’s farewell tour of Africa — besides the development funds he handed out like “Santa Claus” — was his admission that American plans for another military base in that continent are dead. The question remains: Was an AFRICOM headquarters in Africa doomed by the increasing opposition to the plan among Africans and their governments, or was it done in by mission creep?

AFRICOM began in February 2007 as simply a separate command to oversee all U.S. military operations in Africa (except Egypt). But it also stood for more than streamlining responsibilities. Enmeshed in its DNA from day one was what the Pentagon refers to as “capacity building”: By helping Africans build democratic institutions and establish good governance U.S. forces could help root out pockets of poverty and disorder that remain fertile grounds for terrorist groups. Also, U.S. soldiers engaged in “soft power” missions could reduce the appeal of extremism and curb peoples’ mistrust of American intentions

The evolution of this approach began taking shape after Sept. 11, 2001 when the military inaugurated Camp Lemonier in Djibuti to monitor terror groups in eastern Africa (ie. those who had previously attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). Importantly, the nearly 1,500 troops were also tasked with providing military-to-military training in different countries and offering the local population development assistance, like building schools and hospitals, digging wells and providing medical and veterinary assistance.

The U.S. military began casting its eyes towards mineral-rich West Africa in 2002 when it launched the Pan Sahel Initiative to help protect borders, track the movement of people and enhance regional security in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. The U.S. military was quick to point out that terror groups (and smugglers) move seamlessly across these mostly unguarded borders, but the garrisons straddling either side of them had no methods to communicate.

The Pan Sahel Initiative was eventually folded into the much more expansive Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. Unlike the previous program’s “Band-Aid approach” of fighting terrorism, TSCTI’s five-year, $100 million budget not only increased the number of countries involved — adding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria — but also added the hearts-and-minds approach.

From the get-go, it seemed the Pentagon became serious about leveraging its soft power in West Africa. Shooting exercises with the Malian military, for example, were combined with trips to villages to provide treatment for malnutrition, malaria, stomach worms and a handful of other maladies.

But while the footprint for the U.S. military remained relatively small for the TSCTI — “we like to fly under the radar,” a soldier told me — the Pentagon couldn’t shake skepticism over America’s real interests. Africa Confidential’s editor Patrick Smith questioned whether the U.S. was making the mistake of viewing Africa through the lens of the War on Terror. A 2005 International Crisis Group report showed that even with the region’s high poverty rates, mounting governance issues and the few terror groups operating within its borders, “the Sahel is clearly not a hotbed of terrorist activity…” Others pointed out that the U.S. warmed up to Africa only after the Chinese government began throwing its money around the continent. And the fact that the U.S. will soon purchase 25 percent of its oil from African states didn’t go unnoticed.

In pushing for a U.S. presence on the continent, the Pentagon argued that an AFRICOM “staff headquarters” (the term “base” was rarely used) would allow the military to better serve and train local soldiers, better provide development work and more quickly respond to crisis and contingencies. That’s when the project began running into roadblocks. Most African countries didn’t mind the extra equipment and training for its militaries, and the locals certainly didn’t mind the occasional doctors and veterinarian visits. But providing the U.S. government with real estate for a permanent base was beyond reproach.

South Africa refused first, and its neighbors soon followed suit. The continent’s other major power, Nigeria, also vocally declined. Only Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf welcomed the Americans. (Liberia was once home to a Cold War-era U.S. communications station.) In Accra Wednesday, Bush reiterated that he would seriously consider her invitation.

African intransigence might just have saved Bush and the Pentagon from more headaches, such as defining AFRICOM’s role, alternately defined as preventing African crises from spiraling out of control, providing “stability” to the continent, offering humanitarian and development assistance, and creating economic and political growth.

With the backdrop of Kenya’s post-election chaos in mind, the Washington Post’s David Ignatius addressed what seemed to be the command’s first real-world scenario: If AFRICOM were up and running, what would it do in Kenya? The question remains unanswered. Despite disavowing France’s historically corrupt and paternalistic post-colonial African policy, Nicolas Sarkozy still used French forces to rescue Chad’s dictator, Idriss Deby, when he was threatened recently by rebels. Does the U.S. military really want to play such a role on this continent of soaring economies, but still fragile political systems?