While we are still learning the details of last weekend’s mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, there is understandable hope that the chaos in Russia might hasten the end of the war in Ukraine. But it is just as likely, perhaps more so, that the Wagner mutiny created conditions that could actually prolong the war.
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With Spain set to take over the European Union’s rotating presidency on July 1, and snap parliamentary elections scheduled for three weeks later, the country’s position on the war in Ukraine has become more relevant—and more contentious, with both sides of the political spectrum facing internal divisions over the issue.
Ukraine has called for an ICC investigation into the bursting of the Kakhovka dam as an act of “ecocide.” But if the ICC does frame the intentional breaching of the dam as an attack on the natural environment rather than on civilians, the relevant rules of international law would not make such a prosecution a simple matter.
What happens in Ukraine will not stay in Ukraine. That is the essence of an argument commonly made for why the U.S. must support Kyiv in resisting Russian aggression: A failure to stop Russia will give other powers the impression that they can pursue their interests with aggressive impunity. But is that really the case?
Earlier this month, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto proposed a plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Though quickly dismissed as unfeasible by Kyiv and many Western commentators, the proposal is significant for what it reveals about Jakarta’s attempts to navigate the politics of the war in Ukraine.
On Sunday, Montenegrins voted in an election that was remarkable in part for who was not a candidate. For the first time in more than 30 years, Milo Djukanovic—the country’s dominant political figure—was not on the ballot. But despite that notable change, Montenegro’s road to political stability and EU accession looks rocky.
In Italy, reflections on Silvio Berlusconi’s career have tended to view him as a figure whose influence began to wane a decade ago. For observers in countries where populist politics have emerged more recently, he embodies trends that still define Europe’s fractious politics. These clashing narratives each have a grain of truth.
A gathering crescendo of voices calling for Ukraine to join NATO had raised hopes among some observers that Kyiv might be offered membership at the alliance’s summit next month. Those hopes have been dashed by recent comments from French and German officials. But despite arguments to the contrary, Ukraine should join NATO immediately.
South Africa’s stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that the country’s crisis of governance is not confined to the domestic scene. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s approach to the war has been afflicted by the same blend of ineffectual leadership and ideological grandstanding that characterizes his domestic performance.