The need for European states to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels has never seemed greater, and opinion polls indicate firm support for the measures needed to do so. Yet growing signs of disquiet among some voters over the tradeoffs needed to make green policies work signals that public support cannot be taken for granted.
With NATO membership for Kyiv off the table in the immediate term, some are calling for an alternative mechanism dubbed the “Israel Model,” in which the U.S. would provide Ukraine with the kind of security it provides Israel so it can defend itself after the war ends. But there are several reasons why that approach is inappropriate.
Some observers are worried that the U.S. decision to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine will damage the international norm against their use. But while there are many other good reasons to be concerned, the reputational impact of this decision will likely fall on the parties themselves for violating the norm, not on the norm itself.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s annual leaders’ summit in early July highlighted the group’s potential to be a potent force multiplier for both Russia and China, particularly in the context of great power competition. But it is still a work in progress, and many obstacles remain before it can realize its potential.
Spain’s right-wing People’s Party is poised for victory in Sunday’s elections, but to return to power, it will have to form a coalition government with the far-right Vox party. Though most associated with its anti-immigration stance, Vox is also hostile to Spain’s long-established consensus around gender equality and LGBTQ rights.
This week, the leaders of CELAC, comprising the states of the Western Hemisphere excluding the U.S. and Canada, will meet with their EU counterparts in Brussels to discuss the two regions’ relationship. Early indications suggest that differences over Ukraine could potentially hinder progress on other important topics at the summit.
This week’s NATO summit was an opportunity for the alliance to take a clearer position on its own role in the war in Ukraine, while also setting the direction for NATO’s future evolution. But rather than paving the way forward, the summit indicated that the alliance members are only ready for more of the same.
When Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced last Friday that his government had collapsed, few people were surprised. The four-party coalition he led was an ill-fitting amalgamation of contradictory agendas. Rutte’s declaration that he would end his political career, however, sent a jolt through the country—and Europe.
When news of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group’s march to Moscow broke, there was palpable shock among EU and U.S. officials. The extent to which Western governments were blindsided by a crisis that had been building for months was a reminder of how institutions in the U.K., EU and U.S. struggle to manage geopolitical risk.
The true danger for NATO is not the emergence of European defense capacity, but the lack of it. A rebalanced alliance will require a new paradigm based on closer NATO-EU cooperation with a stronger European pillar within NATO. That will only happen if Europe adopts, and the U.S. supports, a more ambitious European defense agenda.
The AfD party’s current success in Germany was built on social trends that had already become entrenched before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Rather than reflecting a sudden break from the moderate center right, the AfD offered a viable political home for far-right milieus that had always been lurking at the edge of party politics.