The latest row between Washington and Riyadh over the decision by OPEC+ to cut oil production is not just a dispute over oil prices. It is a more fundamental divide between the U.S. and most of its Middle East security partners over what’s at stake in the war in Ukraine, and how each side sees the current geopolitical map.
The rise and decline of the West’s strategic commitment to Indochina from the 1950s to the 1970s should be kept in mind when examining U.S. and European relations with the Gulf monarchies today. Though ties between the two sides are still extensive, U.S. and European policymakers are reassessing their commitment to the region.
OPEC+ announced last week that it will cut oil production by 2 million barrels per day starting in November, driving up prices globally. The U.S. responded by framing the cuts to oil production as a nakedly self-serving move that will benefit Russia, singling out Saudi Arabia as the ringleader of that collective effort.
Saudi King Salman issued a royal order last week to make his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, prime minister. While the position is symbolic, it consolidates the crown prince’s de facto control of Saudi Arabia and guarantees him sovereign immunity, staving off legal action against him in a U.S. courtroom.