The latest row between Washington and Riyadh over the decision by OPEC+ to cut oil production is not just a dispute over oil prices. It is a more fundamental divide between the U.S. and most of its Middle East security partners over what’s at stake in the war in Ukraine, and how each side sees the current geopolitical map.
In the upcoming midterm U.S. congressional elections, Republicans are expected to regain control of the House of Representatives and possibly the Senate, which would put them in position to undermine U.S. efforts to support Ukraine militarily. However, concerns that Republicans will do so are unfounded for three reasons.
Iran’s sale of drones to Russia and reported engagement on the ground in Ukraine could further complicate its already rocky relationship with the West. But despite this, Iran and Russia still stand to gain geopolitically and economically from an expansion of their collaboration, even if it is a partnership of convenience.
Among the many concerns raised about Russia’s war in Ukraine is that it is using tactics that constitute genocide. But when human rights advocates focus so much on the genocide label, they risk drawing attention away from actions that are as bad or worse, but also easier to punish when called “crimes against humanity.”
It is not polite, as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas put it in June, to say, “I told you so.” But the West had a “Russia problem” long before it had a “Putin problem.” The Baltic states warned Europe and the rest of the world about this. The world didn’t listen. And Ukrainians have paid a horrible price as a result.
The news that Russia has begun to employ Iranian military equipment, particularly kamikaze attack drones, in its war against Ukraine has led some observers to frame that conflict as a proving ground for Iran’s military technology. But the implications for military dynamics in the Middle East are far from clear.
Until recently, many observers expected the war in Ukraine would end with a deal, once the equilibrium point between Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine and Europe’s growing economic crisis was found. The events of the past month have called into question whether such an equilibrium can and will be reached.
NATO defense ministers pledged more air defense systems for Ukraine and strongly condemned Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians in missile attacks in response to the bombing of a bridge in Crimea last week. But Kyiv continues to complain that some EU countries are not doing enough to deliver military aid quickly enough.
Russia’s annexation of four partially occupied areas in Ukraine would appear to turn the U.N. Charter on its head, prompting some observers to wonder whether it has outlived its usefulness. In fact, however, the charter is working exactly as was envisioned, and perhaps even better than its framers hoped, for three reasons.
The scale of the military effort in support of Ukraine’s struggle for survival has provided stark evidence of how distorted U.S. and European defense priorities have been over the past two decades. The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder that the U.S. and Europe must fundamentally reassess how they prepare for war.
OPEC+ announced last week that it will cut oil production by 2 million barrels per day starting in November, driving up prices globally. The U.S. responded by framing the cuts to oil production as a nakedly self-serving move that will benefit Russia, singling out Saudi Arabia as the ringleader of that collective effort.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marked an opportunity for Germany and Poland to converge around their shared interests in the face of a common threat. But developments since then have resurfaced the many lingering questions regarding the two countries’ differences, which often reflect broader divides across the continent.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba began a 10-day visit across Africa this week that was billed as an attempt to “better explain Ukraine.” It’s a welcome change of pace from Kyiv, whose engagement with Africa amid the war has consisted of diplomatic improprieties and unfamiliarity with African diplomatic positions.
Russia unleashing the destructive power of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be catastrophic, but not solely because of the physical damage the weapon would cause. Instead, Russia’s use of a nuclear weapon would be catastrophic because it would cause us to enter a new world, one transformed in three permanent ways.
Europe’s eyes were fixed on Prague today for the inaugural summit of the European Political Community assembling all of continental Europe’s leaders, besides Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko. But tomorrow’s European Council meeting focusing on Europe’s energy crisis is expected to deliver more tangible outcomes.
Many analysts expected Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to include a cyber Armageddon as part of the conflict. So when those expectations didn’t materialize, the initial surprise quickly turned into declarations that Ukraine had won the “cyber war.” But it’s still possible that Moscow will turn up the dial on its cyber operations.
Last month, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo noted that the country’s first-ever presidency of the G-20 in 2022 was a sign of its growing global stature. The remarks spoke to how Jokowi is walking a fine line between selectively engaging abroad, while also seeking to advance his immediate policy priorities at home.