Members of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s inner circle could hardly hide their glee over the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. Despite some notable breakthroughs in U.S.-Turkey relations during the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, key points of tension remain. Erdogan and his team are optimistic that with President-elect Donald Trump back in the White House, Washington will be an easier partner. Erdogan has some reasons for short-term optimism, but he may find himself disappointed over the longer term.
Ankara’s Selective Memory
In part, Ankara’s reaction to Trump’s victory is the result of selective memory. It was Trump, after all, who responded to Turkey’s continued detention of Andrew Brunson—a U.S. evangelical pastor arrested on espionage charges in 2016—with a threat to remove all U.S. diplomats from the country and “impose large sanctions.” It was Trump, too, who promised to “totally destroy and obliterate” Turkey’s economy in 2019 when tensions arose over both sides’ conflicting military agendas in Syria. In both cases, Turkey backed down. Trump also banned Turkey from purchasing the F-35 multi-role fifth-generation combat aircraft in July 2019 and imposed sanctions on Ankara in December 2020, both measures due to Turkey’s purchase of Russian-made S400 surface-to-air missiles.
Moreover, it was under Biden that, after lengthy wrangling, bilateral relations began to thaw, with Ankara dropping its hold on admitting Sweden and Finland into NATO in a tacit quid pro quo for U.S. approval of a sale of upgraded F-16s to Turkey.
Nonetheless, in many other ways, Erdogan has been tremendously frustrated with the Biden administration, beginning with Biden’s tendency to deprioritize U.S.-Turkish relations and his refusal to grant Erdogan the face-to-face meetings that the Turkish president thrives on. Under Biden, too, the U.S. has moved to develop more extensive military cooperation with Greece and Cyprus; officially recognized the Armenian Genocide; continued to freeze Turkey out of the F-35 program; and retained U.S. troops in Syria in alliance with the YPG, the Syrian Kurdish militia that Turkey quite rightly sees as linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, a Turkish Kurdish insurgency with which Ankara has been at war since 1978. Moreover, Turkish citizens—including Erdogan himself—are absolutely outraged by U.S. support for Israel’s ongoing military actions in Gaza and Lebanon.
Hopes for a Breakthrough
One reason that Erdogan might be particularly optimistic about the incoming administration in Washington is that he and Trump seemed to have enjoyed a generally warm relationship during Trump’s first term in office, and they share compatible approaches to how diplomacy should work. During the first Trump administration, Erdogan and Trump held multiple in-person meetings and had frequent phone conversations, according to some reports as often as twice a week. It helps that, according to these same reports, Erdogan found Trump easy to manipulate: As one anonymous source put it to reporter Carl Bernstein, “Erdogan took him to the cleaners.” Trump and Erdogan both believe in narrow transactionalism and the value of close personal relations between leaders. Moreover, Trump has a clear record of being enthralled by “strongmen.” Little wonder, then, that Erdogan is optimistic about bilateral relations going forward.
There are several areas in which Turkey can reasonably hope for improvements. One longstanding irritant in bilateral relations had been the presence in the U.S. of Fethullah Gulen, the leader of an Islamic movement whom Turkey holds primarily responsible for the attempted coup against Erdogan in 2016. Turkey had long been pressing Washington for Gulen’s extradition, at one point offering to exchange Brunson—the evangelical pastor—for Gulen. But Gulen died in October, so the question of his extradition is now moot.
Turkey also lobbied the first Trump administration over the ongoing case against Halkbank, a Turkish bank that continues to face federal charges for breaching U.S. sanctions against Iran, and Trump previously seemed sympathetic to Erdogan’s pleas in this regard. Trump has also been sympathetic to Erdogan’s efforts to negotiate a U.S. military withdrawal from northern Syria. During Trump’s first term, his staff repeatedly intervened to ensure that U.S. troops remained. There is no guarantee such efforts would be successful this time around. If anything, the incoming administration seems determined to limit this kind of “friction” between Trump’s decision-making and actual policy outcomes going forward. Trump is also likely to look sympathetically at further arms deals, including possibly F-35s, should Erdogan convince him that doing so would enhance U.S. influence—and boost the U.S. economy.
While Turkey will likely see some improvements in its relations with the U.S. under Trump on at least some fronts, it is by no means certain that a second Trump-Erdogan honeymoon will be in the offing.
Turkey might also profit from an end to the war between Ukraine and Russia, which Trump stated during the campaign he would accomplish once in office, if not before. Ankara publicly maintains its support for full Ukrainian sovereignty and has successfully portrayed itself as an invaluable ally to Kyiv, particularly through sales of Turkish armed drones, but also through the closure to Russian naval vessels of the maritime straits controlling access to the Black Sea. But the reality is less clearcut. Turkey, alone among its NATO allies, has maintained extensive trade ties with Russia and has both supported and profited from helping Russia evade sanctions. This policy has only been constrained by repeated warnings from the U.S. Treasury Department, which Ankara has typically been quick to address.
That said, it seems clear that if Trump ends U.S. support for Ukraine and a peace deal is in the offing, Erdogan will be happy once again to insert himself as a potential intermediary. It is equally certain that Turkey would be happy to play a leading role in rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged infrastructure and seeking additional economic opportunities as soon as the war is over. With its proximity and relatively low-cost labor, combined with the technical knowhow of its construction sector, Turkey would be well-placed to aid in Ukraine’s reconstruction, just as it did after the U.S. war in Iraq.
Potential for Trouble Ahead
While it seems likely that Turkey will see some improvements in its relations with the U.S. under Trump on at least some of these fronts, it is by no means certain that a second Trump-Erdogan honeymoon will be in the offing.
First, there is the question of Trump’s Cabinet picks, which so far have not been noteworthy for their warmth toward Ankara. To the contrary, Sen. Marco Rubio, who has been nominated as Trump’s secretary of state, has long been a vocal critic of Turkey. Rep. Michael Walz, who will step in as national security adviser, is seen as friendly to the Kurdish YPG in Syria and has co-sponsored bills aimed at sanctioning Turkey. More generally, the Christian right, which is well-represented in Trump’s new team, has generally been distrustful of Turkey under Erdogan. Whether any of this will matter in the end is anyone’s guess. But there will certainly be some doubting voices when it comes to Turkey in Trump’s new Cabinet.
The question of the Israel-Palestine conflict will also exacerbate tensions between the two governments, especially when it comes to Gaza. There is a good case to be made that Erdogan has been louder in his criticism of Israel’s war crimes there than his actual policies suggest. Turkey has cut bilateral economic ties, for instance, but continues to serve as a hub for Azerbaijani oil destined for Israel. Nonetheless, his public denunciations of Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza are almost certain to raise hackles in the incoming Trump White House, which, if anything, is likely to be even more fulsome in its support for Israel than the Biden administration has been. Turkey’s continued relations with Hamas will be another cause of friction. Erdogan, for his part, is unlikely to rein in his criticism of Israel, particularly if Israel moves forward with plans for the annexation of Gaza and the West Bank, as appears increasingly possible.
Will these sticking points cause relations between Turkey and the U.S. to break down? Possibly not. Both Trump and Erdogan have demonstrated a tremendous capacity for compartmentalization. Nonetheless, the Israel-Palestine crisis is likely to remain a sore point between the two allies going forward. And depending on domestic political considerations on both sides, it could become a serious issue in bilateral relations.
Further on the horizon is a much larger risk for Ankara, and it is one that few Turkish analysts seem to have considered yet: the question of NATO’s future. Turkey’s membership in the alliance is one of the keys to its international prestige. The fact that it is both a critic of the West and part of the West’s premier security bloc gives it greater heft in the global arena. Its capacity to veto NATO decisions in particular is a potent arrow in its diplomatic quiver. Without the NATO alliance, Turkey would lose the star status it now enjoys and become just another middle power. Moreover, losing the security guarantee of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that comes with NATO membership would fundamentally change Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Russia, making Ankara immediately more vulnerable and significantly raising the risks of any potential tensions with Moscow.
We do not know what Trump’s plans for NATO are. He has threatened to withdraw the U.S. completely, but it is hard to know how much of that is bark and how much bite. But he clearly does not feel that the alliance should dominate U.S. security considerations in the way his predecessors have. Nor is it absolutely certain that, if push came to shove, Trump would risk war on behalf of the alliance. Of course, this is a concern for all of Washington’s allies, but Turkey—whose relations with the European Union have become increasingly difficult and which remains, as the saying goes, “in a tough neighborhood”—is particularly vulnerable.
Ankara may indeed find the incoming Trump administration an easier partner to work with than the Biden team has been. But with Trump nothing is ever certain, and the risks facing Turkey under his leadership may end up being far greater than the officials currently rejoicing in Ankara ever expected.
Howard Eissenstat is Laurentian Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History at St. Lawrence University and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute.